Todas las entradas por miguelsantos1

Nomi Prins: La siniestra evolución de nuestro sistema bancario moderno

I quit Wall Street and decided that it was time to talk more about what was going on inside it, as it had changed. It had become far more sinister and far more dangerous.
~ Nomi Prins

Hoy en día, la “puerta giratoria” que conecta a nuestros sistemas políticos y financieros es evidente para cualquiera que tenga ojos. Pero esta relación entrelazada entre Washington DC y Wall Street no es nada nuevo, precediendo incluso a la formación de la Reserva Federal.

En esta entrevista de PeakProsperity, conversan con Nomi Prins, veterana  de Wall Street (que ahora labora por reformar a la industria financiera), y autora del excelente libro All The Presidents Bankers, para tener cierto sentido de la evolución del sistema actual.

Nomi Prins entra en detalle al narrar como se dio la justificación y el proceso detrás de la creación de la Reserva Federal hace 100 años atrás, y más importante, como la forma de su mandato, influyo en el comportamiento del sistema bancario en general. Tornándose así de ser simples redes entre bancos centrales hasta llegar al régimen de robo sancionado en el que ahora vivimos.

Miguel Santos García
Bibliotecario Auxiliar

Reporte filtrado de ex-economistas del IMF sobre situación en Puerto Rico

david

Se ha filtrado un reporte via medios sociales sobre la situación financiera y económica de Puerto Rico , dicho informe fue  creado por ex-economistas del Fondo Monetario Internacional, Anne Krueger, Ranjit Teja, y Andrew Wolfe.

Según el Periódico Digital Puertorriqueño La Nación, El informe de los ex-economistas del FMI y el Banco Mundial contiene controvertidas medidas y recomendaciones como recortar casi el 70% de los fondos que recibe la UPR por parte del Gobierno, así como despidos masivos en el Departamento de Educación. También incluye en una de sus recomendaciones la disminución del salario mínimo a ⅓ de su nivel actual (de 7,25$ a 2,39$), así como disminución y eliminación de una serie de derechos laborales, como la extensión del periodo probatorio de tres meses a hasta dos años o la reducción de evidencia necesaria para demostrar justa causa para despidos.

 

Por Miguel Santos García

Yanis Varoufakis: El Minotauro Global: América, Europa y el Futuro de la Economía Mundial

Charla con Yanis Varoufakis (Ministro actual de finanzas Griego desde Enero 2015) en el 6to festival de ‘Subversive’  del 2013, cinema Europa, Hall Müller, Zagreb, Croacia.

En su notable y provocativo libro, Yanis Varoufakis reta el mito de que la financialización, la regulación ineficaz de los bancos, la codicia y la globalización fueron las causas medulares de la crisis económica mundial. Más bien, son síntomas de un malestar mucho más profundo que se puede remontar hasta la Gran Depresión de 1929, y luego a través de la década de 1970: el momento en que nació un ‘Minotauro Global’ como Yanis le llama.

Así como los atenienses mantenían un flujo constante de homenajes a la bestia de Creta, pues asimismo el ‘resto del mundo’ comenzó a enviar increíbles cantidades de capital a América y a Wall Street. Por lo tanto, este Minotauro Global se convirtió en el “motor” que movio a la economía mundial desde la década de 1980 a 2008.

La crisis actual en Europa, los acalorados e interminables debates sobre la austeridad frente a adicionales estímulos fiscales en los EE.UU., el choque entre las autoridades de China y la administración de Obama en cuanto a las las tasas de intercambio son los síntomas inevitables del debilitamiento de este Minotauro; de un llamado “sistema” global que es ahora tan insostenible como desequilibrado. Más allá de esto, Varoufakis establece las opciones disponibles para nosotros para volver a introducir un poco de razón en un orden económico global altamente irracional.

Por Miguel Santos García
Bibliotecario Auxiliar

Miguel Santos

Explicación de las Licencias Creative Commons


Realizado por Creative Commons Aotearoa New Zealand con ayuda de InternetNZ. Para más información sobre Creative Commons in New Zealand visítanos en creativecommons.org.nz

El video forma parte del curso “Introducción a la Educación Abierta” realizado por el Proyecto LATIn, adaptando el diseñado por David Wiley.

El objetivo del curso es describir de forma general las bases y aspectos fundamentales de las áreas de conocimiento asociadas a la Educación Abierta, basado en la la filosofía y principios marco que han inspirado al Proyecto LATIn.

Este es parte de una serie de cursos cuyo objetivo es orientar a los docentes a lo largo del proceso de elaboración de los primeros libros de texto abiertos de la iniciativa.

Por Miguel Santos
Bibliotecario Auxiliar
Miguel Santos

Aaron Swartz, Intellectual Property, and the Humanities

Aaron-Swartz-internet-act-011

[http://s-usih.org | Escrito por Ben Alpers]

The tragic suicide earlier this month (back in 2013) of programmer and activist Aaron Swartz has initiated a series of public conversations, both about the life and work of this extraordinary young man and about the meaning of his death. The latter discussions have been dominated by concerns about perceived prosecutorial overreach and the relatively greater attention that our federal government seems to give to apparently minor violations of intellectual property law compared to, say, financial crimes and torture. Much attention has rightly been placed on the behavior of Carmen Ortiz, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, who was in charge of prosecuting Swartz for mass downloading journal articles from JSTOR via MIT’s computer network with the intent to distribute them free of charge. Less attention has been given to the behavior of JSTOR and MIT in relation to Swartz, though it is often noted in passing that JSTOR opposed prosecution, while MIT supported it.

PV4Ujx6
But as important as the details of the Swartz case are, the broader context in which it took place needs to be given more consideration. How do we find ourselves with the extraordinary, dysfunctional intellectual property (IP) regime that has ballooned in the last four decades? And, of more direct interest to this blog, how should scholars in the humanities and the institutions in which we work, deal with this situation?

The first question, at least, has received a fair bit of attention over the years, thanks largely to legal scholars like Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle.* The second question, however, is of more local import. But to those of us who work in history and the other humanities and (at least soft) social sciences, it is a vital question.

The intellectual property rules-of-the-road have been vastly changed over the last several decades, largely at the behest of the entertainment industry, whose corporations own valuable pieces of intellectual property that would have slipped into the public domain due to their copyrights’ expiring. In addition to greatly lengthening the term of copyright, new laws, supposedly occasioned by the rise of digital technologies, have also restricted the realm of fair use. Not surprisingly, a set of rules designed to protect the pecuniary interests of a very unusual set of IP owners doesn’t work so well at dealing with the vast majority of older works, which are substantially less valuable and less in danger of becoming the object of profit-robbing piracy than of becoming unavailable as a result of staying under copyright. Of particular concern in this regard are “orphan works,” books, music, movies and other copyrighted items whose rights holders are unreachable for various reasons. When a work’s copyright owner is difficult to locate or establish, reproducing that work becomes effectively impossible. These copyright laws are of particular concern for those of us who study the history of the last hundred years or so.

Aaron-Swartz-suicide

Universities’ behavior in this brave new world of IP has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been largely dictated by those fields whose IP is of greatest monetary value, especially the so-called STEM disciplines. As even public institutions become ever more dependent on private funds, the ability of institutions to maintain financial interests in intellectual property produced on their campuses and by their employees is understandably of great interest. Such concerns often put universities on the side of greater restriction in the area of IP law. Even those of us who are academics in non-STEM fields have experienced some of the side effects of these institutional IP concerns.

Moreover, as communities of technologically savvy young people with access to some of the world’s most powerful computer networks, universities were an early target of the entertainment industry’s war on digital piracy. Largely in response to such outside pressure, universities have cracked down on illegal file-sharing among students and faculty. And digital file-sharing is only the tip of this iceberg. When I arrived at OU, the film studies program would invite the general public to attend, free of charge, the screenings for its larger courses. About a decade ago, we got a cease-and-desist letter from a film studio.

Of course, in the humanities, the intellectual property we generate is rarely of any great monetary value. Academic humanists certainly have intellectual property worries, but they tend to concern credit and plagiarism, rather than piracy. Personally, I’m happy to have my book as widely read as possible. If some professor sticks more than one chapter of it in a photocopied reader without paying rights fees, that’s of little concern to me (though, I suppose, a university press would say that if that behavior is multiplied enough times, the press’s ability to stay afloat would be imperiled).

The response of JSTOR — and, as far as I can tell, many of the scholars whose articles Swartz downloaded in apparent violation of JSTOR’s terms of service — to Swartz’s attempt to download and distribute millions of journal articles reflects this primary interest in wide dissemination of scholarly work. JSTOR is, after all, a non-profit. It needs to pay its bills and respect IP law, but it is also in the business of making academic work more, not less, available. These competing interests are nicely on display in the statement it issued back in July, 2011, when the prosecution of Swartz began, which emphasized that Swartz had broken the law, but that, having prevented the further illegal distribution of the content Swartz had downloaded, JSTOR was not interested in further legal action against him. In fact, just before the Swartz incident in 2011, JSTOR had already made freely available all the articles in its database that had already slipped into the public domain. (On the other hand, immediately after the discover of Swartz’s actions, JSTOR seems to have pressured MIT, threatening it with entirely losing access to JSTOR if MIT didn’t itself restrict access for its users to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future.)

Swartz’s suicide prompted a mass twitter protest, in which researcher uploaded thousands of journal article .pdfs, as well as the release of a bookmarklet called JSTOR Liberator that allows access to those public domain articles on JSTOR without having to sign off on JSTOR’s onerous terms of service.

Unlike JSTOR, MIT actively aided in the federal prosecution of Swartz.** For MIT, Swartz’s suicide has become an occasion to revisit that decision. MIT President L. Rafael Reif has tasked Prof. Hal Abelson, who helped found Creative Commons and the Free Software Foundation, to lead an investigation into MIT’s actions in the Swartz case.

I will be very interested to see what comes out of this investigation. The nation — and, indeed, the world — is in serious need of rebalancing its intellectual property laws. Even if we fall short of the utopian visions of activists like Swartz, who worked for a world of free information, copyright law must be made to once again serve the truly social interests for which it was created, rather than the special interests who’ve been rewriting that law for a generation or two. But, in the meantime, academic institutions need to rebalance their own attitudes toward intellectual property, so that they are driven less exclusively by the bottom line and more broadly by the needs of the faculty and students for open access to ideas and texts.
__________________________________________________
* Lessig’s now classic book Free Culture is available (for free) here. And you can hear Boyle in a segment from the latest edition of NPR’s On the Media lamenting the virtual shuttering of the public domain.
** It’s worth noting, in passing, that Massachusetts state authorities had planned to decline to prosecute Swartz before federal authorities took over the case.

¿Qué es un autor? de Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault nos explica ¿Qué es un autor? desde su singular perspectiva histórico-filosófica que dio lugar en la célebre conferencia de 1969.

foucault-que-es-un-autor-asformigas-2

1

Creo que el siglo XIX en Europa produjo un tipo de autor singular que no debe ser confundido con los “grandes” autores literarios, o los autores de textos religiosos canónicos y los fundadores de las ciencias. De manera algo arbitraria, podríamos llamarlos “iniciadores de prácticas discursivas”.

La contribución distintiva de estos autores es que produjeron no sólo su propia obra, sino también la posibilidad y las reglas de formación de otros textos. En este sentido, su rol difiere completamente de aquel novelista, por ejemplo, quien, básicamente, nunca es más que el autor de su propio texto. Freud no es simplemente el autor de La interpretación de los sueños o de El chiste y su Relación con lo Inconsciente, y Marx no es simplemente el autor del Manifiesto Comunista o El Capital: ambos establecieron la infinita posibilidad del discurso.

Obviamente, puede hacerse una fácil objeción. El autor de una novela puede ser responsable de algo más que su propio texto; si él adquiere alguna “importancia” en el mundo literario, su influencia puede tener ramificaciones significativas. Para tomar un ejemplo muy simple, podría decirse que Ann Radclife no escribió simplemente Los Misterios de Udolfo y algunas otras novelas, sino que también hizo posible la aparición de Romances Góticos a comienzos del siglo XIX. En esta medida, su función como autora excede los límites de su obra.

Sin embargo, esta objeción puede ser refutada por el hecho de que las posibilidades reveladas por los iniciadores de prácticas discursivas (usando los ejemplos de Marx y Freud, quienes, creo, son los primeros y los más importantes) son significativamente diferentes de aquellas sugeridas por los novelistas. Las novelas de Ann Radclife pusieron en circulación un cierto número de semejanzas y analogías pautadas en su obra, varios signos, figuras, relaciones y estructuras que podían ser integradas a otros libros. En pocas palabras, decir que Ann Radclife creó el Romance Gótico significa que hay ciertos elementos comunes a sus obras y al romance gótico del siglo XIX: la heroína arruinada por su propia inocencia, la fortaleza secreta que funciona como ciudad paralela, el héroe proscrito que jura venganza al mundo que lo ha excomulgado, etc.

Por otro lado, Marx y Freud, como “iniciadores de prácticas discursivas”, no sólo hicieron posible un cierto número de analogías que podían ser adoptadas por textos futuros, sino que también, y con igual importancia, hicieron posible un cierto número de diferencias. Abrieron un espacio para la introducción de elementos ajenos a ellos, los que, sin embargo permanecen dentro del campo del discurso que ellos iniciaron.

¿No es éste el caso, sin embargo, del fundador de cualquier ciencia nueva o de cualquier autor que exitosamente transforma una ciencia existente? Después de todo, Galileo es indirectamente responsable de los textos de aquellos quienes mecánicamente aplicaron las leyes que él formuló; además de haber preparado el terreno para la producción de afirmaciones muy diferentes a las suyas.

Superficialmente entonces, la iniciación de prácticas discursivas parece similar a la fundación de cualquier empresa científica, pero creo que hay una diferencia fundamental.

2

En un programa científico, el acto fundacional se encuentra en pie de igualdad con sus futuras transformaciones: es meramente una entre las muchas que hace posible. Esta interdependencia puede adoptar distintas formas. En el desarrollo futuro de una ciencia, el acto fundacional puede parecer poco más que una única instancia de un fenómeno más general que ha sido descubierto. Podría ser cuestionado, en forma retrospectiva, por ser demasiado intuitivo o empírico, y sometido a los rigores de nuevas operaciones teóricas, a los efectos de situarlos en un ámbito formal.

Finalmente, podría considerarse una generalización precipitada cuya validez debería ser restringida. En otras palabras, el acto fundacional de una ciencia puede ser siempre recanalizado a través de la maquinaria de transformaciones que ha instituido.

Por otro lado, la iniciación de una práctica discursiva es heterogénea con respecto a sus transformaciones ulteriores.

Ampliar la práctica sicoanalítica, tal como fuera iniciada por Freud, no es conjeturar una generalidad formal no puesta de manifiesto en su comienzo; es explorar un número de ampliaciones posibles. Limitarla es aislar en los textos originales un pequeño grupo de proposiciones o afirmaciones a las que se les reconoce un valor inaugural y que revelan a otros conceptos o teorías freudianas como derivados. Finalmente, no hay afirmaciones “falsas” en la obra de estos iniciadores; aquellas afirmaciones consideradas inesenciales o “prehistóricas”, por estar asociadas con otro discurso, son simplemente ignoradas en favor de los aspectos más pertinentes de su obra.

La iniciación de una práctica discursiva, a diferencia de la fundación de una ciencia, eclipsa y está necesariamente desligada de sus desarrollos y transformaciones posteriores. En consecuencia, definimos la validez teórica de una afirmación con respecto a la obra del iniciador, mientras que en el caso de Galileo o Newton, está basada en las normas estructurales e intrínsecas establecidas en Cosmología o Física. Dicho esquemáticamente, la obra de estos iniciadores no está situada en relación con la ciencia o en el espacio que ésta define; más bien, es la ciencia o la práctica discursiva que se relaciona con sus obras como los puntos primarios de referencia.

3

De acuerdo con esta definición, podemos entender por qué es inevitable que los practicantes de tales discursos deban “regresar al origen”. Aquí, además, es necesario distinguir el “regreso” de los “redescubrimientos” o las “reactivaciones científicas”. “Redescubrimientos” son los efectos de la analogía o el isomorfismo con formas actuales del conocimiento que permiten la percepción de figuras olvidadas u ocultas. “Reactivación” se refiere a algo muy diferente: la inserción del discurso en ámbitos totalmente nuevos de generalización, práctica y transformaciones.

La frase “regresar a”, designa un movimiento con su propia especificidad, que caracteriza a la iniciación de prácticas discursivas. Si regresamos, es debido a una omisión básica y constructiva, una omisión que no es el resultado de un accidente o incomprensión.

Seguir leyendo ¿Qué es un autor? de Michel Foucault

Failed bank made $20M loan to Wynwood developer in final week

A week before Doral Bank was closed by federal regulators, it made a $20 million loan to a company managed by Israeli investor Moishe Mana for 17 different properties around Miami’s Wynwood neighborhood, according to Miami-Dade records.

The 17 assorted properties owned by Melanie Holdings LLC add up to approximately 4.9 acres of real estate. The largest is at 550 N.W. 24th St., and covers 2.7 acres across the street from the Wynwood Brewery.

Doral Bank was closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) on Feb. 27. The bank had operations in Puerto Rico, Florida, and New York. The FDIC entered into an agreement with Banco Popular de Puerto Rico to sell some of the bank’s assets, and is currently in two other agreements to sell the majority of the remaining assets.

Puerto Rico-based Doral Financial Corp. (NYSE: DRL), owned Doral Bank. But who now owns the $20 million loan is unclear since assets were split between the regulator and Banco Popular, which sold some branches to FirstBank Puerto Rico and Centennial Bank.

Mana signed the mortgage agreement on Feb. 19 as the manager of Melanie Holdings. Mana has recently been adding downtown Miami and Wynwood area property to his collection. In late February, Jersey Art Holdings, one of Mana’s companies, bought a 26,083-square-foot building at 172 W. Flagler St. and 21 S.W. 2nd Ave. for $5.1 million.

Mana Wynwood is Mana’s Arts District venture. The group focuses on art, entertainment, and culture and aims to aid in the transformation of Wynwood into an international cultural hub, according to Mana Wynwood’s website.

This mortgage follows a 2011 loan made to Melanie Holdings by Coral Gables-based Banesco USA for $6.37 million, according to Miami-Dade records. The Doral Bank loan was a refinancing and increase of that loan.

The question is why a bank only a week from failing would be interested in making such a large loan.

“In general, some borrowers will stay clear of problem banks because of the associated risks – they don’t want the loan to be jeopardized or someone else to take control and change the terms,” Miami-based bank analyst and economist Kenneth H. Thomas said.

“If a bank is in a situation like Doral Bank, they’d be on a very short lease with regulators,” Thomas said. “Knowing that, any recent loan would be under tremendous scrutiny.”

 

Lincoff, Nina. (3 de marzo de 2015). Failed bank made $20M loan to Wynwood developer in final week – South Florida Business Journal. Recuperado el 3 de marzo de 2015 de http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/blog/morning-edition/2015/03/failed-bank-made-20m-loan-to-wynwood-developer-in.html

 

Por Miguel Santos
Bibliotecario Auxiliar
Miguel Santos

It’s Official: Micromanaging Kills Productivity

[Una nueva investigación sugiere que el Micromanaging no tan solo está obsoleto, sino que es contraproducente al momento de organizar a los empleados que trabajan.]

New research suggests the more you try to dictate how and when employees work, the less they will accomplish.

Ever wonder what really makes employees work harder?

Let’s start with what doesn’t. Contrary to the instinct of micromanagers everywhere, watching over your employees’ shoulders and dictating where and when they should work is perhaps the worst tactic for productivity.

New research from University of Pennsylvania professor Alexandra Michel finds highly educated employees work more when given autonomy over their schedules. In fact, they’ll often work to the point of exhaustion.

Michel saw this herself, when she began her career at Goldman Sachs years ago. There, the average investment banker burned out after nine years and typically quit by age 35. To understand this, Michel spent 12 years studying young executives at two large investment banks.

When employees were pressured to work more, they were less inspired, she found. But when allowed to set their own pace, taking fewer vacations and working on weekends, they could accept it because it was their choice, Michel explained in the summer issue of The Sociological Quarterly, where her study was published.

Of course, employee-dictated schedules aren’t without their flaws. Michel noted many autonomous bankers worked excessively hard, suffering “debilitating physical and psychological breakdowns” as well as back pain, insomnia, addictions, and eating disorders. Others often sacrificed personal needs at the expense of a healthy work-life balance. So while the work schedules were on their own terms, their judgment, creativity, and ethical sensitivity suffered, making life miserable for those around them.

What’s your take on how much autonomy employees should have regarding their schedules?

[Avoiding Micromanagement: Helping Team Members Excel – On Their Own en http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMM_90.htm]

Krasny, J. (10 de julio de 2014). It’s Official: Micromanaging Kills Productivity. Recuperado el 21 de febrero de http://www.inc.com/jill-krasny/what-really-makes-employees-work-harder.html

 

Por Miguel Santos
Bibliotecario Auxiliar
Miguel Santos

When a Wildlife Rehab Center Regulates Charter Schools: Inside the Wild World of Charter Regulation

[El proyecto de Charter Schools es uno sumamente vago e incoherente en cuestiones fiscales, y por ende en el funcionamiento mismo, ya que ni siquiera privatiza correctamente las instituciones. Es un cheque en blanco donde se privatizan las ganancias de los contratos pero socializan al estado las pérdidas de los préstamos/inversiones por unas facilidades decadentes y currículos incoherentes hechos casi al momento; son escuelas sin logística cuyo único fin es planchar contratos en un mundo como el teatro de lo absurdo. Para Puerto Rico, este tipo de proyecto significó la desintegración y la poca integridad que le restaba al sistema de Educación Pública Puertorriquencis]

869390181_b5cbfd4c5c
Escuela Washington Irving (Adjuntas, P.R.)

Charter school “authorizers” are charged with making sure schools can be trusted with kids and with public money. Problem is, many lack the tools to do the job. Nestled in the woods of central Minnesota, near a large lake, is a nature sanctuary called the Audubon Center of the North Woods. The nonprofit rehabilitates birds. It hosts retreats and conferences. It’s home to a North American porcupine named Spike as well as several birds of prey, frogs, and snakes used to educate the center’s visitors.

It’s also Minnesota’s largest regulator of charter schools, overseeing 32 of them.

Charter schools are taxpayer-funded, privately run schools freed from many of the rules that apply to traditional public schools. 

What’s less widely understood is that there are few hard-and-fast rules for how the regulators charged with overseeing charter schools are supposed to do the job. Many are making it up as they go along.

Known as “authorizers,” charter regulators have the power to decide which charter schools should be allowed to open and which are performing so badly they ought to close. They’re supposed to vet charter schools, making sure the schools are giving kids a good education and spending public money responsibly.

But many of these gatekeepers are woefully inexperienced, under-resourced, confused about their mission or even compromised by conflicts of interest. And while some charter schools are overseen by state education agencies or school districts, others are regulated by entities for which overseeing charters is a side job, such as private colleges and nonprofits like the Audubon wildlife rehabilitation center.

Seguir leyendo When a Wildlife Rehab Center Regulates Charter Schools: Inside the Wild World of Charter Regulation

The Four Horsemen [Documental]

Cuatro Jinetes, [Four Horsemen] (2012) es un galardonado documental creado independiente que se atreve a explicar cómo funciona realmente el mundo financiero-político.

Cuatro Jinetes es un documental 2012 dirigido por Ross Ashcroft y la gente de la organización llamada Renegade Economist. La película critica:

  1. el sistema de la banca de reserva fraccional,
  2. las políticas de flexibilización cuantitativa,
  3. la economía basada en la deuda como divisa entre instituciones financieras y
  4. la presión política de los bancos en el Estado-Nación y en los mercados globales, que considera como una grave amenaza para la civilización occidental.

Se critica la guerra contra el terrorismo, que mantiene que no se lucha para eliminar a Al Qaeda y otras organizaciones militantes, sino a una deuda mayor a los bancos.

Como alternativa, la película promueve un retorno a una   economía con el patrón de oro y que se alejen de políticas neo keynesianas y neo liberales.

Entre los entrevistados son Joseph Stiglitz, ex economista jefe del Banco Mundial; Noam Chomsky, profesor de lingüística; John Perkins, autor de Confesiones de un sicario económico; Herman Daly, profesor de economía; y Max Keiser, presentador de televisión y ex operador de finanzas en WallStreet.

23 pensadores a nivel internacional, asesores del gobierno  y personas con experiencia en capital de Wall Street rompen su silencio acertando que nunca volveremos al business as usual tan cotizado desde 1975. Asimismo explican que la sociedad debe enfocarse en problemas materiales y cognitivos, -y no moralistas- para establecer una sociedad moral, justa y costo-efectiva.

 

Por Miguel Santos
Bibliotecario Auxiliar
Miguel Santos

 

 

Seguir leyendo The Four Horsemen [Documental]

Negociación: Bibliografía

La negociación es una discusión entre dos o más entes en la disposición de arribar a términos concretos de una transacción o acuerdo o intercambio de servicios y/o productos. La negociación se da en empresas, organizaciones sin fines de lucro, las ramas del gobierno, los procedimientos judiciales, instituciones financieras internacionales entre las naciones y en situaciones personales como el matrimonio, el divorcio, la crianza de los hijos y la vida cotidiana.

Este diálogo entre dos o más entidades tiene la intención de llegar a un entendimiento y resolver puntos de diferencia, para obtener una ventaja clara  o para elaborar resultados que satisfagan diversos intereses.

El objetivo es conseguir que la otra parte acepte las condiciones que más se acerquen a nuestra última propuesta. El engaño es probablemente la manipulación de percepciones más antigua y rutinaria sobre el objeto de la negociación. Pero el engaño, en cuanto jugada estratégica planeada y ejecutada como tal, también actúa en dimensiones en la que la verificación de data es difícil o imposible dada la situación.

Una de las dinámicas más interesantes, y a menudo más olvidadas, en el proceso de negociación son las relaciónes de poder que existen entre las partes negociadoras y las tacticas y estrategias que usan para mover la negociación a su favor.

Por ejemplo las tácticas de negociación maniplativas pero legales formaban parte integral del juego de la negociación y es poco probable que un ejecutivo que no domine esas técnicas acabe acumulando capital o poder. El engaño, la manipulación de hechos y la regulación de la percepción del oponente son constitutivos del grado del contrato o acuerdo que se establezca. La negociación no siempre es simétrica eso quiere decir que no se hace entre iguales, lo más probable se articule de forma asimétrica, donde las tácticas, estrategias y goles, serán diferentes.

Bibliografía

Por Miguel Santos García,
Bibliotecario Auxiliar

Miguel Santos

Catastroika: Privatization Goes Public [Documental]

Catastroika (2012) es un documental financiado colectivamente con Licencias Creative Commons. Los periodistas Aris Chatzistefanou y Katerina Kitidi, viajan por muchos países en busca de imágenes, información y material sobre los programas de desregulación y privatización que se han realizado en el llamado mundo desarrollado.

catastroika

El documental descubre los resultados de la actual venta de los recursos públicos de Grecia, los cuales se exigen a fin de afrontar la inmensa deuda soberana del país. Slavoj Zizek, Naomi Klein, Luis Sepulveda, Ken Loach y Greg Palast hablan sobre las medidas de austeridad, el gobierno griego, así como del ataque contra la Democracia en Europa, tras la propagación general de la crisis financiera. Académicos y especialistas como Dani Rodrik, Alex Callinicos, Ben Fine, Costas Douzinas, Dean Baker y Aditya Chakrabortty presentan aspectos desconocidos de los programas de privatización en Grecia y en el extranjero.

Por Miguel Santos, Bibliotecario Auxiliar

Miguel Santos

Economía, contabilidad e infraestructura sostenible: Bibliografía

El desarrollo sostenible apela a una realidad tan prioritaria como clara. Los recursos son limitados y nuestra necesidad por los mismo no lo es, por lo tanto debemos administrarlos costo efectivamente, ya que si los consumidores y el entorno están funcionales en sus respectivos aspectos, todos salimos beneficiados. Las empresas sostenibles son en su núcleo sistemas eficientes y suelen aprovechar las más recientes tecnologías verdes, las mejores metodologías y gozan de un óptimo rendimiento socio económico.

Las y los empresarios(as) y emprendedores de las nuevas generaciones no solo tienen los desafíos de sus predecesores, cálculos de costos, guerras comerciales, guerras de divisa, márgenes de ganancias, también deben proveer la sostenibilidad para el mercado, el estado y la sociedad.

Para lograr esto, la economía sostenible debe satisfacer las necesidades de la sociedad tales como la alimentación, ropa, vivienda y trabajo. Esto se debe a que si el mundo se encuentra en la pobreza, las catástrofes serán inminentes, incluyendo las ecológicas.

Además de tecnologías verdes que mejoren las cadenas de producción y bajen los costos de la extracción, producción y distribución, existen formas de crear sostenibilidad en las finanzas de tu negocio o empresa; las finanzas sostenibles adoptan un enfoque ético que supone un giro radical en el principio de funcionamiento de la industria bancaria. La maximización del beneficio económico es necesaria y asegura la sostenibilidad financiera y duradera en el tiempo, y asegura la supervivencia de la entidad financiera. Para ello se debe planear y tener un modelo de negocios claro, tener definidos procesos de negocios con funciones claras y planes de contingencia.

El enfoque de sostenibilidad exige a las empresas trabajar ardua e inteligentemente teniendo éxito económico, cuidado ambiental y atención a los problemas sociales de los mercados en donde se opera. Las empresas, las instituciones y los ciudadanos no podemos estar ajenos a la búsqueda de soluciones a los problemas del planeta si queremos asegurar un largo plazo que ofrezca una vida de calidad a las nuevas generaciones.

Bibliografía

 

Miguel Santos García,
Bibliotecario Auxiliar

Miguel Santos

Las grabaciones de Carmen Segarra: Como Goldman Sachs controla al New York Fed

[La Puertorriqueña Carmen Segarra se unió al Fed de Nueva York a finales de 2011 como parte de una supuesta nueva ola de examinadores bancarios a Wall Street. Siete meses más tarde, fue despedida en medio de diferencias sobre su reporte negativo a Goldman Sachs. El programa radial semanal “This American Life” entrevista a la Sra. Segarra, ofreciendo una mirada sin precedentes dentro de una de las instituciones más poderosas y secretivas en el país. La Reserva Federal de Nueva York se supone que debe supervisar los grandes bancos. Pero cuando Carmen Segarra fue contratada, lo que ella fue testigo dentro de la Fed era tan alarmante que ella decidió grabar lo que ocurría.]

Via Zerohedge — When nearly a year ago we reported about the case of “Goldman whistleblower” at the NY Fed, Carmen Segarra, who alleged she was wrongfully terminated after she flagged “numerous conflicts of interest and breaches of client ethics [involving Goldman] that she believed warranted a downgrade of Goldman’s regulatory rating” and which were ignored due to the intimate, and extensively documented on these pages, proximity between Goldman and either one-time NY Fed Chairman and former Goldman director Stephen Friedman or current NY Fed president and former Goldman employee Bill Dudley, we said:

as everyone knows, both Bill Dudley and Stephen Friedman used to be at Goldman, and as we noted Dudley and Goldman chief economist Jan Hatzius periodically did and still meet to discuss “events” at the Pound and Pense. 

So while her allegations may be non-definitive, and her wrongfful termination suit is ultimately dropped, there is hope this opens up an inquiry into the close relationship between Goldman and the NY Fed. Alas, since the judicial branch is also under the control of the two abovementioned entities, we very much doubt it.

There was hope, but as we said: we doubted it would lead to much more. It didn’t: in April, the NY Fed won the dismissal of her lawsuit:

U.S. District Judge Ronnie Abrams in Manhattan ruled that the failure by the former examiner, Carmen Segarra, to connect her disclosure of Goldman’s alleged violations to her May 2012 firing was “fatal” to her whistleblower lawsuit. Abrams also said Segarra could not file an amended lawsuit.

“Congress sought to protect employees of banking agencies … who adequately allege that they have suffered retaliation for providing information regarding a possible violation of a ‘law or regulation,'” the judge wrote. “Plaintiff has not done so.”

Segarra’s findings that Goldman’s conflict-of-interest practices may have violated merely an “advisory letter” that did not carry the force of law did not entitle her to whistleblower protection under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Abrams said.

The fact that the judge on the case was conflicted, and had a close relationship to Goldman which was represented by her husband also a lawyer, clearly was “irrelevant“:

In her ruling on Wednesday, Abrams also rejected a move by Stengle for greater disclosure by the judge about her husband’s relationship with Goldman Sachs. Abrams disclosed on April 3 that she had just learned that her husband, Greg Andres, a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell, was representing Goldman in an advisory capacity.

Stengle said at the time she would not seek Abrams’ recusal, the judge said, and went ahead the next day with scheduled oral arguments on the defendants’ bid to dismiss the case.

But on April 11, Stengle made a written request for a “more complete disclosure” of Andres’ relationship with Goldman, and Abrams’ own working relationship with another defense lawyer.

Abrams said that was too late, given that Segarra by then would have had a chance to “sample the temper of the court” and perhaps anticipate she would lose unless Abrams recused herself. “The timing of plaintiff’s requests suggests that she is engaging in precisely the type of ‘judge-shopping’ the 2nd Circuit has cautioned against,” Abrams wrote, referring to the federal appeals court in New York. “Such an attempt to engage in judicial game-playing strikes at the core of our legal system.”

One has to either laugh, or weep, because that statement alone merely confirmed what we said a year ago when we said that “the judicial branch is also under the control of the two abovementioned entities”, namely the NY Fed and Goldman.

In any event, the Segarra case disappeared from the public eye, and was promptly forgotten by the just as corrupted media and the public.

ppnr_carmen_segarra19_630x420_131010

At least until this morning, when ProPublica’s Jake Bernstein revealed something quite stunning: “Segarra had made 46 hours of secret audio recordings to bolster her case about what was happening at Goldman and with her bosses.

In a partnership with This American Life, Bernstein dissects the tapes, which portray a New York Fed that is at times reluctant to push hard against Goldman and struggling to define its authority. For example, in a meeting recorded the week before she was fired, Segarra’s boss asks her at least seven times to change her finding that Goldman was missing a policy to handle conflicts of interest, saying,  “Why do you have to do this?”

The full ProPublica story can be found here.

And for those who are time-constrained, and would rather just read the Cliff Notes (the ending should be known to everyone by now), here is Michael Lewis with an op-ed in Bloomberg summarizing the banker-controlled farce the entire US system has devolved to:

“The Secret Goldman Sachs Tapes”

Probably most people would agree that the people paid by the U.S. government to regulate Wall Street have had their difficulties. Most people would probably also agree on two reasons those difficulties seem only to be growing: an ever-more complex financial system that regulators must have explained to them by the financiers who create it, and the ever-more common practice among regulators of leaving their government jobs for much higher paying jobs at the very banks they were once meant to regulate. Wall Street’s regulators are people who are paid by Wall Street to accept Wall Street’s explanations of itself, and who have little ability to defend themselves from those explanations.

Our financial regulatory system is obviously dysfunctional. But because the subject is so tedious, and the details so complicated, the public doesn’t pay it much attention.

That may very well change today, for today — Friday, Sept. 26 — the radio program “This American Life” will air a jaw-dropping story about Wall Street regulation, and the public will have no trouble at all understanding it.

The reporter, Jake Bernstein, has obtained 47½ hours of tape recordings, made secretly by a Federal Reserve employee, of conversations within the Fed, and between the Fed and Goldman Sachs. The Ray Rice video for the financial sector has arrived.

First, a bit of background — which you might get equally well from today’s broadcast. After the 2008 financial crisis, the New York Fed, now the chief U.S. bank regulator, commissioned a study of itself. This study, which the Fed also intended to keep to itself, set out to understand why the Fed hadn’t spotted the insane and destructive behavior inside the big banks, and stopped it before it got out of control. The “discussion draft” of the Fed’s internal study, led by a Columbia Business School professor and former banker named David Beim, was sent to the Fed on Aug. 18, 2009.

It’s an extraordinary document. There is not space here to do it justice, but the gist is this: The Fed failed to regulate the banks because it did not encourage its employees to ask questions, to speak their minds or to point out problems.

Just the opposite: The Fed encourages its employees to keep their heads down, to obey their managers and to appease the banks. That is, bank regulators failed to do their jobs properly not because they lacked the tools but because they were discouraged from using them.

The report quotes Fed employees saying things like, “until I know what my boss thinks I don’t want to tell you,” and “no one feels individually accountable for financial crisis mistakes because management is through consensus.” Beim was himself surprised that what he thought was going to be an investigation of financial failure was actually a story of cultural failure.

Any Fed manager who read the Beim report, and who wanted to fix his institution, or merely cover his ass, would instantly have set out to hire strong-willed, independent-minded people who were willing to speak their minds, and set them loose on our financial sector. The Fed does not appear to have done this, at least not intentionally. But in late 2011, as those managers staffed up to take on the greater bank regulatory role given to them by the Dodd-Frank legislation, they hired a bunch of new people and one of them was a strong-willed, independent-minded woman named Carmen Segarra.

I’ve never met Segarra, but she comes across on the broadcast as a likable combination of good-humored and principled. “This American Life” also interviewed people who had worked with her, before she arrived at the Fed, who describe her as smart and occasionally blunt, but never unprofessional. She is obviously bright and inquisitive: speaks four languages, holds degrees from Harvard, Cornell and Columbia. She is also obviously knowledgeable: Before going to work at the Fed, she worked directly, and successfully, for the legal and compliance departments of big banks. She went to work for the Fed after the financial crisis, she says, only because she thought she had the ability to help the Fed to fix the system.

segarra 2In early 2012, Segarra was assigned to regulate Goldman Sachs, and so was installed inside Goldman. (The people who regulate banks for the Fed are physically stationed inside the banks.)

The job right from the start seems to have been different from what she had imagined: In meetings, Fed employees would defer to the Goldman people; if one of the Goldman people said something revealing or even alarming, the other Fed employees in the meeting would either ignore or downplay it. For instance, in one meeting a Goldman employee expressed the view that “once clients are wealthy enough certain consumer laws don’t apply to them.” After that meeting, Segarra turned to a fellow Fed regulator and said how surprised she was by that statement — to which the regulator replied, “You didn’t hear that.”

This sort of thing occurred often enough — Fed regulators denying what had been said in meetings, Fed managers asking her to alter minutes of meetings after the fact — that Segarra decided she needed to record what actually had been said. So she went to the Spy Store and bought a tiny tape recorder, then began to record her meetings at Goldman Sachs, until she was fired.

(How Segarra got herself fired by the Fed is interesting. In 2012, Goldman was rebuked by a Delaware judge for its behavior during a corporate acquisition. Goldman had advised one energy company, El Paso Corp., as it sold itself to another energy company, Kinder Morgan, in which Goldman actually owned a $4 billion stake, and a Goldman banker had a big personal investment. The incident forced the Fed to ask Goldman to see its conflict of interest policy. It turned out that Goldman had no conflict of interest policy — but when Segarra insisted on saying as much in her report, her bosses tried to get her to change her report. Under pressure, she finally agreed to change the language in her report, but she couldn’t resist telling her boss that she wouldn’t be changing her mind. Shortly after that encounter, she was fired.)

I don’t want to spoil the revelations of “This American Life”: It’s far better to hear the actual sounds on the radio, as so much of the meaning of the piece is in the tones of the voices — and, especially, in the breathtaking wussiness of the people at the Fed charged with regulating Goldman Sachs. But once you have listened to it — as when you were faced with the newly unignorable truth of what actually happened to that NFL running back’s fiancee in that elevator — consider the following:

1. You sort of knew that the regulators were more or less controlled by the banks. Now you know.

2. The only reason you know is that one woman, Carmen Segarra, has been brave enough to fight the system. She has paid a great price to inform us all of the obvious. She has lost her job, undermined her career, and will no doubt also endure a lifetime of lawsuits and slander.

 

Por Miguel Santos,
Bibliotecario Auxiliar
Miguel Santos